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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Respondent’s efforts to convince this Court not to reach the merits of the Petition are nothing

short of herculean. Rather than address the multitude of ways Petitioner ’s ongoing incarceration
violates his rights, Respondent engages in elaborate pettifoggery. In its filings opposing the Petition,

Dkt. Nos. 64-102 (the “Opposition” or “Opp.”), Respondent has simply reasserted the same hypertechnical arguments about why the merits should not be reached: the case is moot, procedural
deficiencies are fatal to the Petition, and there isn’t anything for the Court to remedy because the
2019 denial (the “Decision”) is no longer the “basis for Petitioner’s hold.” Dkt. No. 70 at 19. This

^

sideshow of alleged mootness and procedural technicalities is just that: a sideshow. The Court has
already ruled on the motion to dismiss and concluded that neither supposed mootness nor procedural

technicalities preclude the Court from reaching the merits. There is no basis to revisit or disturb that
holding. Moreover, in light of the Court’s holding, the relevant question before this Court is whether

the Decision withstands judicial scrutiny. However, Respondent has offered little in the way of
defense of the Board’s conclusions.

Indeed, the Opposition accomplishes only one end. It demonstrates that the Decision is
arbitrary and capricious, and Petitioner is entitled to the relief he seeks. In the entirety of thirty-six

.

separate docket entries Respondent has advanced a grand total of two arguments on the merits.

They are: (1) the Decision was reasonable; and (2) the Board literally cannot violate Petitioner ’s

Sixth Amendment rights. See Opp. at H 44. Nowhere in this mound of paper does Respondent

address Mr.

’s argument that he has been denied the meaningful opportunity for release to

which he is entitledunder the Eighth Amendment. Nowhere does the Opposition answer Petitioner ’s
point that the Board’s subjective conclusions about his alleged “limited insight” and purported risk to
public safety are unreasonable in light of the facts in the record. Respondent does not address the
requirement that the Board explain its departure from COMPAS, that it weigh Mr.

’s youth

at the time of the offense in his favor, not against him, or that the reasoning of the King, Rossakis,

1
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and Kellogg courts apply with equal force here. And as to Petitioner’s assertion that the Decision
should be overturned as conclusory? Respondent answers with (conclusory) boilerplate: “the
Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law Section 259-i(2)(A) and N.Y.C.R.R.
Section 8002.3(d)[.]” Opp. at 143.
A primary point buttressing Respondent’s argument that the Decision was reasonable is the
fact that previous parole denials have been upheld by other courts in years past. See Opp. at If 8.

.

Undeniably, that is irrelevant. But more importantly Respondent has failed to contend with the

import of that fact: Mr.

is a rehabilitated juvenile offender who is being denied a

meaningful opportunity for release. He is being subjected, time and again, to interviews wherein the
outcome is a foregone conclusion, such that, with each new denial, the Board of Parole

unconstitutionally increases his sentence by yet another twenty-four months. Should this status quo

be left unchecked, as Respondent urges, Mr.

has virtually no hope of ever regaining his

liberty. After all (as Respondent noted when pointing out the overwhelming weight the Board has

afforded to “the extreme violence of the crime”), why would politically-controlled Commissioners on

the Board ever opt to release Mr.

I*?

Per Respondent’s Opposition, the Board’s statutory authority is boundless, see Opp. at

2,

20, 21, 23, 33, 34, 36, 37, 39, 40, 42, 43. 44, and this Court is effectively powerless to enforce the

legal rights of inmates like Petitioner. See generally id. Those conclusions are belied not just by
reason and logic, but by the United States Constitution.

The Decision is indefensible, and Petitioner is entitled to the relief he seeks.
ARGUMENT

.

I

.

THIS COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO ORDER MR

.

PS RELEASE

At oral argument on December 15, 2020, Respondent argued that this Court’s only authority

under Article 78 is to order a de novo hearing for Mr.

.

See Exhibit 1 at 17. Respondent

has repeated that assertion in the Opposition. Opp. at K 20. Although the basis for Respondent’s
2
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position is clear, see, e.g., Friedgood v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 22 A.D.3 d 950 (3 d Dep’t
2005), a careful reading of both the statutory grant of authority to this Court and case precedent

indicates the opposite. In fact, there are six reasons why this Court can and should order release.
First, the assertion that Article 78 courts may not order release directly contradicts enshrined

principles of statutory interpretation. Second, the 2017 parole revisions instilled a liberty interest in
parole procedure. Third, the ability of courts to convert habeas corpus proceedings into Article 78
petitions is indicative of judicial authority to order release in this context. Fourth, given that parole

determinations are mixed criminal and administrative proceedings, and in light of the presumption of
lenity, any ambiguity in the law must be read in Petitioner ’s favor. Fifth, unlike administrative

decisions that are made by agencies that possess some expertise that the court lacks, (a) the Board of

Parole possesses no such special expertise, and is staffed by political appointees without any parole-

.

specific special training; and (b) the underlying conviction and sentence originate with the judiciary
not

with the Board of Parole, which distinguishes the Board from agencies that make initial

determinations, such that the Supreme Court is suitably positioned to overrule the Board. Sixth,
logic and public policy considerations cannot be ignored: it would be abhorrent to conclude, as

Respondent urges, that the judiciary lacks authority to correct an ongoing violation of Petitioner ’s

constitutional rights.
A.

Basic Principles of Statutory Interpretation Demonstrate That Previous
Decisions on This Issue Are Erroneous.

.

1

Plain meaning, context, and legislative history demonstrate the breadth of
this Court ’s authority

.

Well-settled principles of statutory interpretation demonstrate this Court’s authority to order
Mr.

’s immediate release. Recently, the Court of Appeals summarized those principles:
When presented with a question of statutory interpretation, our primary
consideration is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the
Legislature. As we have often explained, because the clearest indicator
of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point in any case

3
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of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the
plain meaning thereof. We are also guided in our analysis by the
familiar principle that a statute must be construed as a whole and that
its various sections must be considered together and with reference to
each other. Additionally, we should inquire into the spirit and purpose
of the legislation, which requires examination of the statutory context
of the provision as well as its legislative history.
Town of Aurora v. Village of East Aurora, 32 N.Y.3 d 366, 372 (2018) (internal citations omitted).

Likewise, “construction should not be utilized to eviscerate the very purpose for which the legislation
was enacted [and] ... [a] court should avoid a statutory interpretation rendering the provision

meaningless or defeating its apparent purpose.” Miglino v. Bally Total Fitness of Greater New York,
No. 2010-06556, 2011 WL 6825539, at *5 (2d Dep’t 2011) (quoting State v. Cities Sendee Co., No.

64300, 1992 WL 34289 (3 d Dep’t, Feb. 20, 1992)). “It is the spirit, the object, and purpose of the
statute which are to be regarded in its interpretation.” Id. (quoting Westchester County Soc.for

Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Mengel, 266 A.D. 151 (2d Dep’t 1943), aff’d, 292 N.Y. 121).

Article 78, pursuant to which Petitioner seeks relief, states the following;
The judgment may grant the petitioner the relief to which he is
entitled, or may dismiss the proceeding either on the merits or with
leave to renew. If the proceeding was brought to review a
determination, the judgment may annul or confirm the
determination in whole or in part, or modify it, and may direct or
prohibit specified action by the respondent. Any restitution or
damages granted to the petitioner must be incidental to the primary
relief sought by the petitioner, and must be such as he might otherwise
recover on the same set of facts in a separate action or proceeding
suable in the supreme court against the same body or officer in its or
his official capacity.
C.P.L.R. § 7806 (emphasis added). The language of the statute evinces its purpose; to permit courts

like this one to right wrongs committed by administrative decisionmakers, such as the Board of

Parole, by directing or prohibiting any action. See generally Siegel,N.Y. Prac. § 570 (6th ed.). And
the administrative decision need not merely be annulled or confirmed by the judge evaluating it; it

4
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may be directly modified. The plain meaning of the text leaves no doubt: this Court has the power

“to render any judgment appropriate to the case.” Id. (emphasis added).
Context1 also favors this interpretation. When Section 7806 is examined within the larger

body of law that enumerates the powers of the Article 78 court, the breadth of the court’s authority is

incontrovertible. Contempt, when necessary to enforce an Article 78 ruling, is within the purview of
the court. See C.P.L.R. § 5104; 6A N.Y. Jur. 2d Article 78 § 403. Injunctive relief is also within
judicial authority. See Policemen ’s Benev. Ass ’ n of Westchester County , Inc. v. Board of Trustees of
Village of Croton-on-Hudson, 21 A.D.2d 693 (2d Dep’t 1964). Likewise, the Article 78 court may
convert a procedurally improper form of filing, as required, see Siegel,N.Y. Prac. § 570 (6th ed.)

(“[T]he relief [can be] shaped to the case without ... regard to form.”), and it has the power “to

review abuses of discretion as to the measure or mode of penalty or discipline,” which has been
deemed to include the power to reduce a punishment imposed by an agency as the court sees fit. Id.
(citing C.P.L.R. § 7803(3); Mitthauer v. Patterson, 8 N.Y.2d 37 (I960)). In fact, the judgment
powers enumerated in Section 7806 for Article 78 “special proceedings” are notably more fulsome

than the counterpart provision for judgments in an “action.” Id. (citing C.P.L.R. § 5011) (“[With the
language in Section 7806,] the legislature is merely assuring that the court has the requisite power to

render any judgment appropriate to the case. If the record is complete enough to enable the court to
render a final judgment on the merits, the court will do that; if the case entails a correction of errors

and requires further proceedings by the respondent, the correction will be made and back will go the
case.”).

See, e.g., Gundy v. United States , 139 S.Ct. 2116, 2126 (2019) (“It is a fundamental canon of statutory
construction that the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their place in the overall
statutory scheme.”)

5
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Similarly, the legislative history2 of Article 78 proceedings demonstrates the breadth of the
court’s authority. The forms of relief encompassed by Article 78 are age-old:

The common-law remedies of certiorari to review, mandamus, and
prohibition are remedies of ancient origin derived from the English law
which, at an early time, became part of the law of New York with such
modifications as our basic law made necessary. When the former Civil
Practice Act was adopted and became effective in 1921, the remedies
of certiorari to review, mandamus, and prohibition were continued, but
the writ practice was abolished in favor of an order. In 1937, the
legislature combined the remedies under a proceeding against a body
or officer in Article 78 of the former Civil Practice Act. The former
CPA Article 78 was in turn superseded in 1963 by N.Y. Article 78 of
the C.P.L.R. which provides that relief previously obtained by writs of
certiorari to review, mandamus, or prohibition must be obtained in a
proceeding under Article 78, and that wherever in any statute reference
is made to a writ or order of certiorari, mandamus, or prohibition, such
a reference must, so far as applicable, be deemed to refer to the
proceeding authorized by this article. Article 78 proceedings exist
primarily to afford relief to parties personally aggrieved by
governmental action.
6 N.Y. Jur. 2d Article 78 § 1 (citing Dunne v. Harnett, 92 Misc.2d 48 (Sup. Ct. 1977), aff' d, 59
A.D.2d 1065 (1st Dep’t 1977)) (other citations omitted). In other words, “[t]he intended purpose and

effect of Article 78 ... was to simplify and unify the procedure in connection with the three old

remedies of certiorari to review, mandamus, and prohibition and to wipe out technical distinctions
which hampered the court in granting relief for proved grievances.” 6 N.Y. Jur. 2d Article 78 § 2.
The Court of Appeals itself has recognized the legislative intent underlying Article 78. See
Newbrand v. City

of Yonkers, 285 N.Y. 164, 174 (1941) (holding that the legislative purpose of

Article 78 was to “wipe out technical distinctions which had been a snare for suitors approaching the
court for relief and which, at times, hampered the court in granting relief for proven grievances”).

1

See, e.g., Kimmel v. State, 29 N.Y.3d 386, 397 (2017) (“Although the plain language of the statute provides the
best evidence of legislative intent, the legislative history of an enactment may also be relevant and is not to be
ignored, even if words be clear because the primary goal of the court in interpreting a statute is to determine and
implement the Legislature’s intent.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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A discussion of mandamus is instructive. The word mandamus derives from Latin, and
means “we command.” 6 N.Y. Jur. 2d Article 78 § 79. Mandamus relief —a remedy of “ancient

origin derived lfom the English law which, at an early time, became part of the law of New York,”
see 6 N.Y. Jur. 2d Article 78 § 1

“grants a higher court supervisory authority to command an

inferior court, tribunal, board, corporation, or person to perform a particular duty required by law.” 6
N.Y. Jur. 2d Article 78 § 2 (citing Bresnickv. Saypol, 57 N.Y.S.2d 904 (Sup. Ct. 1945), modified on

other grounds, 270 A.D. 837 (1st Dep’t 1946)). Both historically and today, mandamus is available

where there is a “clear legal right to the relief sought.” Id. (citing Gonzalez v. Annucci , 136 A.D.3 d
909 (2d Dep’t 2016). See also Dinsio v. Supreme Court, 125 A.D.3 d 1313 (4th Dep’t 2015)); 24

Carmody-Wait 2d § 145:375 (citing People ex rel. Perdue v. Jablonsky , 174 Misc.2d 604 (Sup. Ct.
1997) (noting that the Article 78 court may use its mandamus power to compel action by the

Commissioner of the State Department of Correctional Services)). Meaning, when the legislature
codified Article 78, it empowered the Article 78 court to invoke its mandamus power to compel a
body (the Board of Parole and/or the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision) to act
(release Mr.

on parole) or to refrain from taking an action (continuing Mr.

’s

incarceration) that is in contravention of law (the Eighth Amendment, the Sixth Amendment, Section
259-i, and all the other laws cited by Petitioner). Id. (citing Bailey v. McDougall, 66 Misc.2d 161
(Sup. Ct. 1970), affd, 36 A.D.2d 903 (2d Dep’t 1971)).

.

2

Caselaw concerning the Article 78 court ’s authority to order release is
erroneous, such that this Court may decline to follow precedent

All modes of statutory interpretation—the plain language of Section 7806, its context within

the larger framework of New York statutory law, and the legislative history underlying Article 78—
demonstrate that this Court is well within its authority to order Mr.

’s release. Although

some New York courts have concluded otherwise, a close examination of that precedent

demonstrates that it is erroneous and should not be followed, in spite of stare decisis .

1
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Just last year, the Supreme Court addressed how stare decisis should be managed in the face
of erroneous precedent.
Stare decisis promotes the evenhanded, predictable, and consistent
development of legal principles, fosters reliance on judicial decisions,
and contributes to the actual and perceived integrity of the judicial
process. Of course, it is also important to be right[.]
Gamble v. United States , 139 S.Ct. 1960, 1969 (2019) (internal quotation marks and citations

.

omitted). In his concurrence Justice Thomas added:
It is always tempting for judges to confuse our own preferences with
the requirements of the law, and [misinterpretation of the stare decisis
principle] exacerbates that temptation by giving the veneer of
respectability to our continued application of demonstrably incorrect
precedents. By applying demonstrably erroneous precedent instead of
the relevant law’s t e x t . . . the Court exercises “force” and “will,” two
attributes the People did not give it ... . When faced with a
demonstrably erroneous precedent, my rule is simple; We should not
follow it.
Id. at 1981-84 (Thomas, J. concurring) (citing The Federalist No. 78, p. 465 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961))
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Justice Thomas’s sentiment has been explicit in

New York jurisprudence for decades. See Matter of Simonson v. Cahn, 27 N.Y.2d 1, 3 (1970) (“The

doctrine of stare decisis does not enjoin departure from precedent or preclude the overruling of

..

earlier decisions.”). Though valid appellate precedent is generally binding on trial courts, see, e.g
People v. Turner , 5 N.Y.3 d 476 (2005), “stare decisis does not require blind deference to flagrant
error.” Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 148 (1977) (Jasen, J. concurring). See also People v.

Hogan, No. 18, 2016 WL 633920, at * 8 (2d Dep’t Feb. 18, 2016) (Rivera, J. dissenting) (quoting
People v. Bing, 76 N.Y.2d 331, 338 (1990)) ("'Stare decisis is not meant to fit the Court like a

straight] acket and to prevent mistakes from being rectified. While ‘a court should be slow to

overrule its precedents, there is little reason to avoid doing so when persuaded by the lessons of

8
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experience and the force of better reasoning.’”).3

The cases that state the principle that Article 78 courts cannot order parole release are
demonstrably incorrect. To begin, most state the conclusion sui generis , merely citing to previous
cases that have also stated that principle, without providing any further reasoning to support the

conclusion. See, e.g. Matter

of Newton v. Dennison, 47 A.D.3 d 538 (1st Dep’t 2008); Quartararo v.

New York State Div. of Parole, 224 A.D.2d 266 (1st Dep’t 1996). On the rare occasion reasoning is

provided, it is imported from another area of administrative law that has nothing to do with parole.
See, e.g., Rossakis v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 146 A.D.3 d 22, 29 (1st Dep’t 2016) (citing to a
case about vehicle repairs). And if the case is from the last 25 years, the string of supporting

citations invariably leads back to a 1994 Court of Appeals case that does not actually support the
proposition; King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994). King does not say that
courts are restricted in their ability to order remedies in an Article 78 preceding. Id. at 790. It merely

affirms a First Department case, which itself does not make any assertions about the power of the

Article 78 court, and simply says that “the Parole Board should have the opportunity to make that
determination using the appropriate standard,” without citing any supporting material. King v. New
York State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 435 (1st Dep’t 1993). Thus, reliance on King is

misplaced. And to the extent cases on this issue predate King, they typically point to the statute and
assert something like “[t]he proper remedy is a judgment directing the board to give the reasons as

demanded by petitioner.” Speed v. Regan, 50 A.D.2d 1100, 1100 (4th Dep’t 1975); see also Licitra
v. Coughlin, 93 A.D.2d 349, 352 (3rd Dep’t 1983). In short, this body of precedent is either without

3

Moreover, Petitioner has found no caselaw holding that a trial court judge must follow precedent that the judge
believes to be erroneous. In light of that fact Petitioner respectfully asserts that to the extent precedent is
incorrect, as are the cases on this issue, that precedent is not “valid” and binding on lower courts.

.
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analysis, or it relies upon a faulty premise.4
Yet even if statutory interpretation did not render previous caselaw on this issue erroneous,

where the conditions surrounding the establishment of an original precedent have so changed as to

.

render strict adherence to that precedent harmful or detrimental to society New York law is
unequivocal; a court faced with original precedent may dispense with the rule. Simonson, 27 N.Y.2d
at 3 (holding that “where the principles announced prove unworkable or out of tune with the life

about us, at variance with modern-day needs and with concepts of justice” a court may disregard
stare decisis and overturn precedent); Grifenhagen v. Ordway , 218 N.Y. 451, 458 (1916) (holding

that reversal of precedent may be appropriate where, “through changed conditions it has become
obviously harmful or detrimental to society”). Indeed, “[a] rule of law which is out of tune with life

about us and at variance with modem needs and with concepts of justice and fair dealing should be
disregarded.” 28 N.Y. Jur. 2d Courts and Judges § 232 (emphasis added) (citing Endresz v.
Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d 478 (1969); Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656 (1957); Rakaric v. Croation
Cultural Club, 76 A.D.2d 619 (2d Dep’t 1980)). Given (1) recent jurisprudence concerning juvenile

offender punishment in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), and its progeny; (2) modem

scientific advancements concerning criminology and the juvenile brain;5 (3) the egregious

4

5

Additionally, Petitioner respectfully asserts that this case is distinguishable from precedent insofar as Petitioner
has challenged his continued incarceration on the grounds that he is being denied the meaningful opportunity for
release owed to all juvenile offenders who have not been found permanently incorrigible based on Supreme
Court precedent, and not merely because the Board of Parole misapplied the statutory factors bearing upon
release. Petitioner has found no caselaw holding that a trial court cannot order immediate release in the precise
circumstances presented by this case, which are unique and present a potential constitutional conundrum. Thus,
Petitioner respectfully argues that there is no precedential authority barring this form of relief.
See, e.g „ Morgan Tyler, Understanding the Adolescent Brain and Legal Culpability , American Bar Association
(Aug. 2015) (available at https://tinyurl.com/yy3 j7b4b) (last visited Jan. 11, 2021); Coalition for Juvenile
Justice, Adolescent Brain Development , at Section 1.2 (available at https://tinyurl.com/y24ct4a7) (last visited
Jan. 11, 2021); Alexandra O. Cohen and BJ Casey, Rewiring juvenile justice: the intersection of developmental
neuroscience and legal policy ,Massachusetts General Hospital, Center for Law, Brain & Behavior (Feb. 2014)
(available at https://tinyurl.com/y5mj6qpt) (last visited Jan. 11, 2021).
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circumstances presented by this Petition, and (4) the fact that Mr.

is merely one of

hundreds, if not thousands, of similarly situated juvenile offenders in New York,6 strict adherence to
precedent is undoubtedly detrimental to society.

Further, concluding that this Court lacks authority to release Mr.

, as Respondent

urges, would be inconsistent with the Article 78 court’s remedial authority in other contexts.

Numerous cases outside the context of parole demonstrate the court’s authority to fashion remedies

beyond remand. See, e.g., Brunner v. Russi , 182 A.D.2d 1136, 1136 (4th Dep’t 1992) (“Where a
duly constituted administrative board has imposed a penalty, the court in an article 78 proceeding
may determine that the penalty imposed was excessive and state the maximum penalty the record

will sustain”); Police Benev. Ass ’n of State Trooper v. Vacco , 253 A.D.2d 920, 921 (3rd Dep’t 1998)
(citing Hartje v. Coughlin, 70 N.Y.2d 866 (1987) (“Where, as here, the record is complete enough to

enable the Court to render a final judgment on the merits, remittal is not appropriate, especially
where the agency is merely seeking a second chance to reach a different determination on the

merits”)); Maier v. Coughlin, 193 A.D.2d 1015, 1015 (3 d Dep’t 1993) (“Expungement of inmate’s
record in connection with alleged assault on another inmate was appropriate remedy, as opposed to

remittal for rehearing, for denial of inmate’s right to call certain witnesses at hearing, where
significant amount of time had passed since incident, and one witness was dead and another had been

released on parole.”); Girard v. Glens Falls, 173 A.D.2d 113, 118 (3rd Dep’t 1991) (“[I]n instances

6

As of January 2016, the most recent year for which data could be found, 632 New Yorkers were serving life
sentences for offenses they committed between the ages of 13 and 17. See American Civil Liberties Union,
False Hope: How Parole Systems Fail Youth Sewing Extreme Sentences (Nov. 2016) at 24 (available at
https://tinyurl.com/r9r4epc) (last visited Jan. 11, 2021); Editorial Board, New York Forgets Its Juvenile Lifers ,
New York Times (Mar. 24, 2018) (available at https://tinyurl.com/t2y66jn) (last visited Jan. 11, 2021), New
York also has a significantly higher number of juvenile offenders serving life sentences than almost any other
state. See The Sentencing Project, Still Life: America ’s Increasing Use ofLife and Long -Term Sentences (May 3,
2017) (“Indeterminate life sentences for juveniles are most heavily concentrated in California, Texas, New York,
and Georgia. Together these states account for 63% of the total population of those serving [life with parole] for
crimes committed as juveniles,”).
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where remittal for a new hearing would be unfair under the circumstances ... the appropriate relief is
not remittal but outright annulment”). One First Department case that was affirmed by the Court of

Appeals, Matter of Pantelidis v. New York City Bd. of Stds. & Appeals, is noteworthy. 43 A.D.3 d
314 (1st Dep’t 2007), affd, 10 N.Y.3 d 846 (2008). The Pantelidis court held:

Beyond question, judicial deference to administrative authority and
expertise is an important principle, as illustrated by the decisional law
cited by the dissent. Such deference does, however, admit of some
elasticity, especially where a full administrative record is in existence,
the agency has had an opportunity to rule on all issues, and the matter,
although within the agency’s purview, does not require resolution of
highly complex technical issues.
Id. at 317 (emphasis added).7 While none of these examples involve a case wherein a court

mandated that the Board of Parole release a prisoner, they nonetheless demonstrate that the
categorical assertion that Article 78 itself prevents any remedy other than remittal—as Respondent
argues—is invalid. This Court can and should order Petitioner’s immediate release.

B.

The 2011 Parole Revisions Instilled a Liberty Interest in Parole Procedure.

In general, “when a State establishes a sentencing scheme which creates a legitimate

expectation of early release from prison, there does exist a liberty interest which is entitled to

constitutional protection.” People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128,
131 (1st Dep’t 1983). In 2011, significant amendments were made to the state parole statutes and the

regulations governing parole. Compare N.Y. Exec. Law. § 259-c (McKinney 2012), with,N.Y. Exec.
Law. § 259-c (McKinney 2010) andTA.Y . Exec. Law § 259-i. Although the Second Circuit Court of

Appeals found that the pre-amendment statute did not create a liberty interest, see Fuller v. Evans ,
586 Fed. App’x 825, 826-27 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[W]e considered the effect of the pre-amendment

7

Petitioner asserts that there is a fully developed record tinderlying this Petition; the Board of Parole has had the
opportunity to rule on all issues, as evidenced not just by the denial underlying this case, but also by the six
preceding denials; and as discussed infra, the Board of Parole has no special expertise and makes decisions
based upon politics, not specialized knowledge or insight.
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statute and regulations together in 2001 and found no due process interest in parole.”), in the years

.

since New York federal courts have recognized the viability of the argument that the newly amended
New York laws create a liberty interest, such that due process protections apply to parole

proceedings. See, e.g., Linares v. Annucci , 710 Fed. App’x 467, 470 (2d Cir. 2017); Kindler v. City

of New York, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160253, at * 13-14 (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 19, 2019). Petitioner thus
asserts: (1) the 2011 amendments to the statute and regulations surrounding parole created a liberty

interest; (2) pursuant to that liberty interest, Mr.

has a right to due process; (3) Mr.

’s right to due process has been and continues to be violated by the Board of Parole; and (4)
this Court has authority to order Mr.
C.

’s release as a remedy to those due process violations.

The Ability of Courts to Convert Habeas Corpus Proceedings into Article 78
Petitions is Indicative of Judicial Authority to Order Release.

Courts considering petitions from incarcerated New Yorkers have notable procedural

flexibility. See, e.g., 6 N.Y. Jur. 2d Article 78 § 341 (collecting cases concerning judicial authority to

procedurally modify claims by incarcerated persons). Where appropriate, a court may convert a state

postconviction habeas corpus petition into an Article 78 petition. See, e.g., Piersma on behalf of
Majors v. Henderson, 44 N.Y.2d 982 (N.Y. 1978); People ex rel. South v. Hammock, 80 A.D.2d 947
(3 d Dep’t 1981); People ex rel. Ganci v. Henderson, 54 A.D.2d 609 (4th Dep’t 1976). Likewise, a

habeas corpus petition has been deemed an appropriate vehicle for challenging a parole denial.8 See,

..

e.g People ex rel. Yates v. Walters, 111 A.D.2d 839 (2d Dep’t 1985). Thus, the parameters some

appellate decisions have erected around the Article 78 judge’s remedial authority are inapposite for
two reasons. First, the power to convert between the two proceedings suggests that the New York

Supreme Court possesses broad procedural flexibility in the context of releasing those who are

wrongfully incarcerated. Second, the forms of relief available in habeas corpus petitions are
To be clear, Petitioner is not requesting that the Court convert this Article 78 special proceeding to a petition for
habeas corpus Petitioner is merely citing to the Court’s inherent authority to make such conversions as further
evidence that the Court has broad and flexible remedial authority

.

.
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available in Article 78 parole petitions. With respect to the latter, a habeas petition permits a wide
range of remedies. See, e.g., People ex rel. Rosenthal v. Wolfson, 48 N.Y.2d 230, 232 (N.Y. 1979)

(reversing bail denial and setting a specific amount for bail); People ex rel. Merced v. Warden, Otis

Bantum Correctional Ctr., No. 250538/07, 2008 WL 211530019 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 19, 2008)
(granting release from custody); People ex rel. Spencer v. Coord, 179 Misc. 2d 85 (Sup. Ct. 1998)
(granting immediate release). Thus, this Court ’s remedial authority is, at the very least, coextensive

with its authority to address a petition for habeas corpus, and the Court therefore has authority to
order Petitioner ’s release.

.

D

.

The Rule of Lenity Supports This Court’s Authority to Order Release

Parole determinations are not purely administrative; at best, they are mixed criminal and

administrative proceedings.9 In recent years, courts examining federal administrative law have
begun to acknowledge that the deference given to administrative decision-making—pursuant to
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc ., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) and similar cases—is

improper in the context of criminal liability. See, e.g., Esquivel-Quintana v. Lynch, 810 F.3 d 1019,
1027 (6th Cir. 2016) (Sutton, J. concurring) (“Chevron has no role to play in construing criminal
statutes . . . . The application of Chevron to criminal laws also would leave no room for the rule of

lenity, a rule that resolves ambiguities in criminal statutes in favor of the individual and a rule of

construction that Chief Justice Marshall described as ‘perhaps not much less old than construction
itself.’”). Moreover, where a rule or statute may have criminal, rather than just civil implications,
courts are bound by the rule of lenity to resolve a point of ambiguity in favor of the person facing the

potential criminal consequences. See U.S. v. Thompson/Center Anns Co ., 504 U.S. 505, 518 (1992);
see also U.S. v. Scully , 108 F. Supp. 3d 59, 108 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (quoting Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543

9

.

For avoidance of doubt Petitioner reaffirms his argument that he holds a liberty interest in parole release
following the 2011 amendments to New York’s parole laws, that he has a right to due process that is being
ritually violated by the Board of Parole, and this argument as to the quasi-criminal nature of the agency
proceeding is made arguendo.
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U.S. 1, 11 n.8 (2004)) (“When ... a statute has both criminal and noncriminal applications, the
Supreme Court has stated the rule of lenity applies.”).

This Petition arises under a complex framework of laws and regulations, each of which has
criminal implications for Mr.

.

Among others, they include; the statute and sentencing laws

pursuant to which he was sentenced; the Board of Parole’s agency authority, as codified in statutes

and regulations, to make decisions concerning parole release; the United States Constitution, and the
rights it imparts on juvenile criminal offenders and criminal defendants generally; and the grant of
authority to this Court to review parole decisions pursuant to Article 78. Obviously, the agency

decision-making at issue here has direct criminal consequences for Mr.

. When he is

denied parole release, his incarceration continues, despite his rehabilitation and fitness for release.10

And should Respondent prevail in the argument that this Court lacks authority to order Mr.

’s release, the criminal implications for Mr.

are even more egregious. Not only

would he be subject to continued incarceration and an eighth, farcical parole denial decision. Worse,

he could be left without recourse in the courts to challenge the Board’s authority as an agency.
Meaning, the statutes this Court must interpret in the case at bar are not merely civil; they have
momentous criminal implications for Mr.

. Insofar as the remedial authority to the Article

78 judge is ambiguous under this body of law 11 those laws may not be interpreted in favor of the
,*

government (meaning, with deference to the agency and its interpretations of the law). Instead, the

rule of lenity mandates that the body of statutory law underlying this Petition be read in Mr.

’s favor, and this Court find that it has authority to order release.
E.

The Board of Parole Lacks Any Special Expertise That Might Undermine the
Article 78 Court’s Authority to Overrule Board Decisions.

There are situations in which individuals with a specialized set of skills or expertise make
10

11

.

In light of this Petitioner respectfully asserts that this Court need not adhere to the type of deference to agency

decisions that is afforded in Article 78 proceedings that lack criminal implications.
Petitioner reasserts that there is no ambiguity, and this Court has clear authority to order Petitioner’s release.
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agency decisions (for example, at the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation).

Where agency decisions address, as the Pantelidis court put it, “highly complex technical issues,” or
where the underlying determinations originate with an agency and not with a court (for instance, in
the case of a local zoning dispute), it is fathomable that an Article 78 judge may be poorly positioned
to stand in the shoes of the agency and remittance for re evaluation may be prudent. But there are no

such considerations here.

.

1

.

Politics, not expertise, underlies the Board of Parole

The New York Board of Parole is made up entirely of political appointees. See DOCCS,
About the Board.12 There is no requirement that any of these appointees possess specialized
expertise or training—in psychiatry, psychology, criminology, law, or otherwise— for appointees to
qualify for positions on the Board. See generally id :, RAPP Campaign, Parole Justice Advances as

Legislature Closes—But Not Far Enough (Jun. 19, 2019) (detailing the failures in the nomination of

Board Commissioners by Governor Andrew Cuomo in 2019 including, “[h]alf of the candidates put
forward by the Governor came from prosecutorial or law enforcement backgrounds,” and “[t]he
Cuomo administration also shared no information on how they sourced candidates,” and the like).13

Indeed, the primary qualifier for appointment (and reappointment) appears to be the would-be

.

Commissioner ’s ties to politicians. For instance Commissioner William Smith, who has been on the

Board for approximately 20 years, has made numerous large political donations to state Senator

Patrick M. Gallivan. See Christopher Zoukis, Report Highlights Shortcomings of New York’s Parole
Board (Jan. 8, 2019), https://tinyurl.com/ruapwga (last visited 1/7/2020). Smith has also made
substantial contributions to Senator Michael Ranzenhofer. See New York State Parole Board:
Failures in Staffing and Performance, Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History, at 12-22

12
13

Available at https://doccs.ny.gov/about-board (last visited Jan. 11, 2021).
Available at http://rappcampaign.com/nys-parole-board-staffing-a-nominee-to-reject/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2021).
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(2018) (detailing Smith’s activity in politics and his atrocious history of documented misconduct).14
Senator Gallivan chairs the New York Senate’s Crime Victims, Crime and Correction Committee,

which is illuminating given Commissioner Smith’s well-documented history of problematic conduct
towards parole applicants, and both Senators’ explicit support of his re-appointment. Notably, Mr.
Smith is one of the Commissioners who authored the denial at issue in this case.
Moreover, not only are the appointments purely political; the Board’s decision-making is

heavily influenced by politics. In 2019,New York legislators noted that “current law makes the

board susceptible to political pressure to deny parole to inmates with high profile crimes even if they
are thoroughly rehabilitated with excellent prison records.” See Jarrett Murphy, Advocates Press

Albany to Fix New York’s Parole System (Jan. 30, 2019) (citing a legislative memo attached to a bill

authored by New York State Senator Gustavo Rivera).15 One former Commissioner, Thomas Grant,
noted that among several other problems with the New York system, Commissioners are
disincentivized from granting parole to people whose release would be newsworthy. See generally
Nazgol Ghandnoosh, The Next Step: Ending Excessive Punishment for Violent Crimes (Apr. 2019)
at Section VII.16 Grant indicated that, because the system is “broken, terribly broken,”

Commissioners may fear voting in favor of release in cases that attract media attention. Id. Along

the same lines, a former chairman of the Board, Robert Dennison, has explicitly noted the power
politics and media have over the Board. See id. According to Dennison, “if you let someone out and

it’s going to draw media attention, you’re not going to be re-appointed.” Id.

.

Thus, in the first instance Commissioners have no special expertise that would enable them
draw factual conclusions concerning whether a potential parolee is truly rehabilitated or whether he

14

15

16

Available at https://ir.lawnet.fordham. edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? article=1008 &context=pp (last visited Jan. 11,
2021),
Available at https://tinyxirl. com/rqx623m (last visited Jan. 11, 2021).
Available at https://tinyurl. com/y6y2poce (last visited Jan, 11, 2021),

17
31 of 60

INDEX NO.

FILED: SULLIVAN COUNTY CLERK 01/15/2021 06:13 PM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 106

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/15/2021
FUSL000094

poses a danger to society. They are guided by politics, not by expertise. (Indeed, the Commissioners

ongoing refusal to credit the expert opinion concerning Mr.

’s obvious rehabilitation, which

was presented in a detailed report from a forensic psychologist, directly underscores the political
nature of their decision-making.) To wit, Petitioner has been unable to find any requirement that,

before appointment, Commissioners be educated—or, post-appointment, that they receive training

about key advancements in modem science that bear upon the parole inquiry, such as the lesser
criminal culpability of juvenile offenders, the phenomenon whereby offenders “age out” of crime, the
correlation between poverty, abuse, and crime, etcetera. See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 25 (February 6, 2020
Brief of Parole Preparation as Project as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner

D, 26

(February 6, 2020 Brief of the Sentencing Project as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner

|'s Motion for Leave to Appeal). In light of these facts, there is simply no valid policy
concern to be raised that the Supreme Court may need to defer to the “expertise” of the Board of

Parole, even if review of administrative decisions in other contexts may implicate such concerns.

.

2

Parole disputes originate in the court system, making judges appropriate
arbiters of disputed parole determinations

.

Some Article 78 petitions challenge administrative decision-making that originate within the
context of the administrative agency. For instance, the New York State Parks, Recreation and

Historic Preservation might deny an applicant a permit to hold an event at a park on Long Island. To

the extent a legal dispute arose from that denial, the issue could be considered to have originated with
the Parks agency. The same might be said of disputes involving zoning boards, education-centric
agencies, and the like. By contrast, the issues raised in Article 78 petitions from parole denials do
not originate with an agency. Parole applicants only become parole applicants after a plea or

conviction, which happens in the Supreme Court. Thus, from a policy perspective, it would be
irrational to suggest that this Court lacks authority to overrule the Board, as Article 78 judges are in
fact the most appropriate arbiters of disputed parole decisions.

18
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Logic and Public Policy Considerations Mandate the Conclusion that Article 78
Judges Have Authority to Order Parole Release.

.

At oral argument Respondent asserted that this Court lacks authority to do anything more

than remit this matter the Board of Parole for a new hearing wherein, presumably, the same
violations of law will repeat for an eighth time. Exhibit 1 at 17 (“The only remedy available is a de
novo ... interview.”). As this Court suggested during the hearing, that interpretation of the law

defies not only logic, but sound public policy. Respondent’s argument is tantamount to asserting that

the New York Supreme Court lacks authority to enforce the law. Indeed, followed to its logical
conclusion, Respondent has effectively argued that the Court lacks authority to enforce the United
States Constitution and protect the constitutional rights of incarcerated New Yorkers.

Not only is this argument folly in light of supremacy principles17 and New York law,18 but if

accepted, it amounts to a concession that Section 259-i is unconstitutional. Simply put, if New York
judges cannot enforce the United States constitution to protect the rights of juvenile offenders

incarcerated in a New York prison, then Section 259-i empowers the Board of Parole to violate the
rights of those offenders by keeping them incarcerated indefinitely, without a meaningful opportunity
for release, and without access to judicial review of release denials. In that case, the law itself is

unconstitutional because state law cannot strip citizens of their constitutional rights. Thus, insofar as
the Court agrees that it lacks authority to order Mr.

.

’s immediate release Petitioner asserts

that Section 259-i is unconstitutional as to juvenile offenders and must be deemed invalid.

17

18

“Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, state laws that conflict with federal law are
without effect and are preempted.” Birdsong v. Nurture, Inc ., 275 F. Supp. 3 d 384, 387 (E.D.N.Y. 2017)
(quoting Altria Grp., Inc . v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008)).
As noted above, Article 78 judges are empowered with procedural authority as to both habeas and Article 78
petitions. Arguing that the Article 78 judge nonetheless lacks authority to order release over the objection of the
Board of Parole is thus inconsistent with the larger body of New York law as to this issue.
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IF THE COURT DOES NOT ORDER RELEASE. IT SHOULD ORDER A NEW
INTERVIEW BEFORE COMMISSIONERS WHO HAVE NOT PREVIOUSLY
DENIED PAROLE AND WHO MAY ONLY CONSIDER SPECIFIC FACTORS.

As noted supra, this Court has authority to render any judgment it deems appropriate to the

.

case. Even if the Court declines to order release Petitioner respectfully urges the Court to go further

than merely ordering a new interview wherein the same errors that have kept Mr.

in

prison—in spite of seven previous applications for parole—will be repeated. Petitioner respectfully
urges the Court to invoke its authority, whether pursuant to mandamus or otherwise, to fashion the

relief that is most likely to end the ongoing, ritual violation of Petitioner ’s rights and order a hearing
before new Commissioners that only accounts for legal and appropriate factors bearing upon release.

Petitioner also opposes Respondent’s request that the Board be given “a minimum of 60
days” to hold a new interview. Opp. at If 50. In light of the ongoing outbreak of COVID at

Woodboume Correctional Facility, which is the worst prison outbreak in the state,19 Mr.

’s

health and safety are endangered every single day that he remains incarcerated. It would be

.

unconscionable to permit Respondent to delay this process for not days, not weeks, but months
especially given that Respondent has provided no explanation for the request.
A.

The August 2020 Denial Demonstrates that a Pro-Forma Order For a de novo
Interview Will Not Afford Petitioner Relief.

In the parole denial from August 2020 (the “ de novo Decision”),20 see Dkt. No. 29, the

19

20

As of January 8, Woodboume Correctional Facility, where Petitioner resides, is the source of the largest prison
COVID outbreak in the State of New York, See Gwynne Hogan, Nine COVID Deaths, 1,000+ Infections In 3
Weeks: Will NY Do More To Stop The Spread In Prisons?, Gothamist (Jan, 8, 2021) (available at
https://tinyurl.com/yyykwxth). On December 17, 2020, the facility announced that there had already been one
COVTD-causcd death at the facility. See RAPP Campaign, Twitter Press Release (Dec, 17, 2020) (available at
https://tinyurl.com/y4jjx5 c9) (last accessed Jan. 12, 2021), What’s worse, the dearth of data that is being
released by DOCCS makes it “impossible to trace how widespread the vims [truly] is within the prison
system[,]” such that the outbreak at Woodboume is likely more severe than the data indicates, Gwynne Hogan,
Legal Aid Sues State For More COVID-19 Data At Prisons, Where The Pandemic Rages , Gothamist (Dec. 19,
2020) (available at https://tinyurl.com/y5 o6dafr) (last accessed Jan. 12, 2021),
respectfully reserves all of his legal rights and arguments arising from
For the avoidance of doubt, Mr,
in no way waives any arguments that he may
the denial of parole in the de novo Decision. Mr,
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mistakes that were made in the August 2019 denial (the “Original Decision”), see Dkt. No. 19, were
merely repeated and reinforced.21 As this Court is aware, the de novo Decision followed the July 24,
2020 decision lfom the Board of Parole Appeals Unit ordering a de novo interview. A review of the

de novo Decision demonstrates that simply ordering the Board of Parole to re-interview Mr.

will not afford him any relief.

.

1

.

Like the Original Decision, the de novo Decision violates Mr
’s
rights under both the Eighth and Sixth Amendments to the United States
Constitution

.

The Original Decision violates Mr.

’s Eighth Amendment right to a meaningful

opportunity for release, see Dkt. No. 17 at 31-37, and Mr.

’s rights under the Sixth

Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. at 38-44. In addition, the de novo Decision, like

the Original Decision, failed to consider youth as a mitigating factor.22 Thus, nothing in the de novo
interview or Decision cured the defects in the Original Decision.23

.

2

Like the Original Decision, the de novo Decision once again departs from
’
Mr
s low-risk COMPAS score with neither explanation nor
justification.

.

Like the Original Decision (and other, past parole denials), the de novo panel failed to
properly consider Mr.
releasing Mr.

21

22

23

’s COMPAS assessment. The Board has a duty to explain how
|—a model inmate who has spent more than 30 years in prison without ever

rightfully assert based on the de novo Decision, and merely outlines some of those arguments herein for the
further affirmatively reserves the right to file an administrative appeal from the
Court’s reference. Mr.
de novo Decision and any future legal appeals resulting therefrom, including but not limited to future petitions
pursuant to C.P.L.R. Article 78 ,
The similarities detailed in this Section underscore that the Court was correct to deny Respondent’s motion to
dismiss the Petition on mootness grounds, as each of these substantial andnovel issues could evade judicial
review if the Petition were dismissed as moot,
In the de novo Decision, the Board merely stated, “[y]ou were only 14 years old at the time.” Dkt. No. 29 at 42.
Likewise, the transcript of the interview is bereft of any serious or careful discussion of how Mr.
’s age
impacted his actions. In both the interview and the de novo Decision, the panel merely acknowledged, in
passing, Mr.
|’s juvenile offender status, which is insufficient under both Supreme Court and New York
jurisprudence,/^! like the Original Decision.
Had the Petition been dismissed as moot, as Respondent urged, these substantial and novel issues would evade
judicial review.
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committing an act of violence, who is at low risk for felony violence and re-arrest—would

undermine respect for the law. Because the Original Decision failed to explain why it departed from
COMPAS, it is improper and subject to reversal. The Board’s own regulations are clear; if, in

denying release, “the Board departs from the Department Risk andNeeds Assessment’s scores, the

Board shall specify any scale within the Department Risk andNeeds Assessment from which it
departed and provide individualized reason for such departure.” 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.2(a) (emphasis

added). Pursuant to that rule, the Board was required to identify the scale from which it departed and
provide an individualized reason for the departure. See Voii v. Stanford, No. 50485/2020 (Sup. Ct.

Dutchess Cty. May 13, 2020). The Board’s failure to offer individualized reasons for departing from
COMPAS constitutes error warranting reversal. Robinson v. Stanford, No. 2392/2018 (Sup. Ct.

Dutchess Cty. Mar. 13, 2019) (finding that the Parole Board’s determination denying parole release
was affected by an error of law where “the Board’s conclusory statement that it considered statutory

factors, including petitioner’s risk to the community, rehabilitation efforts and need for successful

community re-entry in finding that discretionary release would not be compatible with the welfare of
society failfed] to meet [the requirement of an individualized reason for departing from COMPAS ] ”);
see also Comfort v. New York State Bd. of Parole, No. 1445 /2018 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Cty. Dec. 21,

2018) (finding that the Board did not comply with § 8002.2(a) when it concluded that there was a

reasonable probability that the petitioner would not live and remain at liberty without violating the

law but failed to explain its departure from the lowest possible COMPAS risk score); Coleman v.
New York State Dep ’t of Corr. & Cmty . Supervision, 157 A.D.3 d 672, 673 (reversing denial of Art.
78 petition because “the petitioner ... was assessed Tow’ for all risk factors on his COMPAS ...

.

risk assessment. Thus, a review of the record demonstrates that in light of all the factors

notwithstanding the seriousness of the underlying offense, the Parole Board’s ‘determination to deny

the petitioner release on parole evinced irrationality bordering on impropriety.’”); Rabenbauer v.
New York State Dep ’t of Corr. & Cmty . Supen- ision , 46 Misc.3 d 603, 609 (Sup. Ct. 2014) (ordering
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de novo interview because “the Parole Board ignored the [COMPAS ] risk assessment and made only
superficial inquiry into the statutory factors in Executive Law § 259 -i(2)(c)(A)”).
New York State implemented COMPAS to provide greater transparency, consistency, and

objectivity to the Board’s decisions. The Board adopted COMPAS to comply with its statutory

mandate to “establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions as required by law.
Such written procedures shall incorporate risk and needs principles to measure the rehabilitation of
persons appearing before the board, the likelihood of success of such persons upon release, and assist

members of the state board of parole in determining which inmates may be released to parole
supervision.” N.Y. Exec. Law § 259(c)(4). COMPAS is an empirically validated “research based

clinical assessment” used to assess an incarcerated person’s risks and needs by “gathering quality and

consistent information to support decisions about supervision, treatment, and other interventions.«24
In the de novo interview, the Board acknowledged that “[Mr.

’s] COMPAS Risk

Assessment reflects low risk low need scores. That’s a favorable risk assessment.” Dkt. No. 29 at 28:
18 - 19. In the de novo Decision, the Board further acknowledged “[y]our COMPAS Risk Assessment

reflects low risk and low need scores.” Id. In spite of these acknowledgements, the Board failed to
offer any individualized reason why it departed from COMPAS. (Undoubtedly, because there is no

logical reason, as Mr.

is clearly low risk.) Without an explanation, the de novo Decision

failed to meet its own regulation, § 8002.2(a), just like the Original Decision.25

.

3

Like the Original Decision, the de novo Decision blatantly disregards the
facts to reach conclusions that are directly contradicted by the record

.

In spite of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, just as the Original panel did, the de novo

24
25

DOCCS, Directive No. 8500: COMPAS Assessment/Case Plan, Nov. 19, 2015.
On COMPAS, the Original Decision states, “We depart from your low history of violence COMPAS score as
you described your violent, sexual and physical assaults of the two victims of your instant offenses.” Plainly,
that is not an explanation for a departure from COMPAS, which assesses an inmate’s current risk factors. See,
e.g., Coleman, 157 A.D.3 d at 673. In addition, had the Petition been dismissed as moot, this substantial issue
would have been permitted to evade judicial review.
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panel ignored all factual indications of Mr.

’s rehabilitation. The facts in Mr.

’s

parole application speak for themselves: he has educated himself, found faith, become a leader in his
community, had exceptional behavior, and never , since becoming incarcerated, engaged in an act of

violence. An independent, forensic psychologist deemed Mr.

rehabilitated (which a

DOCCS-employed psychologist later reaffirmed), he has excellent prospects for gainful employment

.

after release, the support of family and friends, recommendation letters from teachers and colleagues

and a strong re-entry plan. Nonetheless, the Original Decision concluded that Mr.

’s

release would be “incompatible with the public safety and welfare,” and then failed to offer even an
attempt at explaining that conclusion. The de novo Decision concluded that Mr.

’s release

.

would “still tend to deprecate your offense so as to undermine respect for the law,” and likewise

offered no explanation whatsoever for how that conclusion followed from the facts in the record.

Previous denials have likewise disregarded the facts in favor of the foregone conclusion that Mr.
should spend the entirety of his life in prison. The Board’s continued blatant disregard of

the facts that weigh in favor of release—now for the seventh time—indicates that a pro forma order
for a new interview will not afford Petitioner the relief he seeks.26

.

4

The de novo Decision, like the Original Decision, denies release solely
based upon the seriousness of the underlying crime

.

The Board cannot deny parole based solely on the nature of the offense. Ferrante v.

Stanford, 172 A.D.3 d 31, 37 (2d Dep’t 2019); Rossakis, 196 A.D.3 d at 27 (holding that the Board
acted irrationally in focusing exclusively on the seriousness of petitioner ’s conviction and the
decedent’s family victim impact statements without giving genuine consideration to petitioner’s
remorse, institutional achievements, release plan, and her lack of prior criminal history); see also,

Huntley v. Evans, 77 A.D.3 d 945, 947 (2d Dep’t 2010) (“[W]here the Parole Board denies release to

26

Further, this substantial and novel issue would have evaded judicial review had the Petition been dismissed as

.

moot
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parole solely on the basis of the seriousness of the offense... it acts irrationally.”). “The legislative

intent behind the Executive Law for parole board determinations relies on a forward-looking
paradigm, rather than a backward-looking approach that focuses on the severity of the crime.”
Miranda v. New York State Bd. of Parole, No. 150995/2020, 2020 WL 6047827, at *4 (Sup. Ct. Oct.
13, 2020) (citing Platt v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 47 Misc. 3 d 1059, 1062 (Sup. Ct. 2015)).

Given that the Commissioners who authored both the Original and the de novo Decision relied solely
on the seriousness of the underlying crime to deny release, a simple instruction that Petitioner

received a new interview, which may include any of the same Commissioners, is insufficient
remedy.27

.

5

.

The de novo Decision, like the Original Decision, was predetermined

Indications that a parole denial was predetermined is ground for a de novo hearing. Johnson
v. New York State Bd of Parole, 65 A.D.3 d 838, 839 (4th Dep’t 2009) (“We therefore conclude on

the record before us that the Parole Board failed to weigh all of the relevant statutory factors and that

there is a strong indication that the denial of petitioner ’s application was a foregone conclusion.”)
(internal citations omitted); see also, Morris v. New York State Dep ’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision,

40 Misc.3 d 226, 233 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (“When, as here, the Parole Board focuses entirely on the nature

of Petitioner ’s crime, there is a strong indication that the denial of parole is a foregone conclusion

that does not comport with statutory requirements.”). In both the Original and the de novo Decisions,

the panels had no intention of giving Mr.

a legitimate, fair interview.28

In fact, there is clear evidence that the de novo Decision was a foregone conclusion and

merely intended to shore up the glaring inadequacies of the Original Decision. In the de novo

.

hearing Commissioner Agostini acknowledged the amount of material in Mr.

’s parole file:

.

“Ihave a lot of reading to do I’ve done some reading in advance of this interview, andI’ll be
27

28

This substantial and novel issue would have evaded judicial review had the Petition been dismissed as moot.
Had the Petition been dismissed as moot, this substantial and novel issue would have evaded judicial review.
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working with the file and continuing to read through it as well after our interview.” At the

.

conclusion of the interview Commissioner Agostini said: “Thank you for your closing remarks, for
the interview, for all the materials that you’ve put together. Truly is a lot to go through but we will

.

go through it, we will deliberate, and we’ll get a decision in writing to you probably next week

okay?” Meanwhile, the de novo Decision—though dated August 18, 2020 on the transcript, and
August 19, 2020 on the written form—notably states, “this panel is concerned about what comes
across as a lack of emotion on your part... observed by this panel today .” Dkt. No. 29 at 43

(emphasis added). Despite assuring Mr.

that the panel would take a thorough look through

his parole file to consider all of the facts, and despite the conflicting dates of the written decision, the
language of the de novo Decision indicates that the panel in fact issued their decision on the same
day as Mr.

’s interview, when they admitted that they had not read the materials he

submitted.29

.

6

The de novo Decision, like the Original Decision, demonstrates the Board ’s
complete and continuingfailure to comply with Section 259-u

Like the Original Decision, the de novo Decision evinces a complete and continuing failure
to comply with substantial, mandatory legal requirements concerning the parole determination. See

McLaurin v. N.Y.S. Bd. of Parole, 27 A.D.3 d 565 (2d Dep’t 2006); Lovell v. N.Y. State Div. of
Parole, 40 A.D.3 d 1166 (3 d Dep’t 2007); Standley v. New York State Div. of Parole, 34 A.D.3 d 1169

(3 d Dep’t 2006); see also Marino v. Travis , 13 A.D. 453, 455 (2d Dep’t 2004); In re Melinda D., 31
A.D.3 d 24, 29 (2d Dep’t 2006); Hill v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 9462,

.

* 15-*16 (N.Y. Sup. Oct. 23, 2020). For brevity Petitioner here lists merely a few aspects of the de
19

Likewise, the obvious hostility from Commissioner Segarra suggests a clear predisposition against Mr,
and unwillingness to carefully evaluate his parole application. See Dkt, No, 29 at 35-39 (insinuating Petitioner
lied when he explained that he was upset following the crime because he must have “just snap[ped] out of it,
then asking if he had a “good day,..a good game” after the crime, and then asking whether, before leaving the
crime scene, “[d]id you puke . . . did you spit on the ground . . . . did you pray?”, and then asking “[t ]he sex
crime, were you aroused, was it pleasurable to you?”).
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novo Decision that render it arbitrary and capricious: (1) the de novo Decision improperly weighed a

factor that counsels in favor of release as a factor against release. Namely, Mr.

’s alleged

thoughtfulness and over-preparedness because he had “well thought out” answers to their questions.30
See Dkt. No 29 at 44. (2) The de novo Decision cites to a non-statutory factor: “community

opposition.” 31 Id. (3) The de novo Decision cites to a non-statutory, non-defined factor that does

exist in the record: “official opposition. »32 Id. Thus, like the Original

not actually appear to

30

J

The Board wrote: “While your documents are in order and your presentation was polished, this panel is
concerned about what comes across as a lack of emotion on your part, noted by your sentencing judge thirty
years ago and observed by this panel today. Your presentation and statements seem clinical and well thought out
rather than from the heart demonstrating a recovery from the rage you must have had[.]” Dkt No 29 In two
for having ‘‘well thought out”
sentences, the Board thus acknowledged and then admonished Mr
crediting
Obviously
than
Mr,
for his insight
, this is nonsensical Rather
answers to their questions.
and honesty, the Commissioners turned the fact that he had prepared for the interview—which he did not only so
that he could be his own best advocate, but out of respect for the forum—against him, and penalized him for
having well-reasoned answers to their questions. Moreover, this was Mr
|’s seventh appearance before
the Board, Meaning, he has attended enough previous parole interviews to know what questions would likely be
is represented by counsel, and as the panel was well - aware (and in fact noted
asked Further, Mr
has affirmatively sought to educate himself while incarcerated. He is now an
specifically), Mr.
educated, middle- aged man, not a fourteen- year old child. His language choices reflect his maturation and
growth in the thirty-plus years since the initial offense To suggest that it is somehow nefarious that he was
prepared for the questions that would be asked during the interview is nothing short of absurd Moreover, the
factor is outside the Board’s statutory authority,
The impropriety of including community opposition in parole decision-making is not a new principle See, e g\,
Brown v Commissioner ofN YS Dep ’t of Correctional Serv ,, 70 A,D,2d 1039, 1040 (4th Dep’t 1979) (holding
that, where the District Attorney provided a letter “expressing community opposition to petitioner’s release,” the
respondents should not have considered the letter”); Howland v Henderson, 54 A D.2d 614 (4th Dep ’t 1976)
(“We find that the reasons given for denial of parole, other than adverse community reaction[,] were meaningful
and a fair statement of a reasonable basis for denial of relator’s release on parole [,]”) (emphasis added). The
only factors that the New York statute permits the Parole Board to consider are those which are clearly
enumerated in Executive Law § 259 i, Nonetheless, in the de novo Decision, the Board not only unlawfully
considered community opposition, but relied upon it as grounds for the denial of parole release
The de novo Decision states, “[t ]he Panel notes official opposition to your releasef.]” Dkt No. 29. Neither the
transcript of the interview nor the Decision itself illuminate what “official opposition” the panel was referring to
However, seemingly, this is a reference to two letters from Mr. Richard M Healy, the district attorney who
prosecuted Mr
’s crime. New York courts have unequivocally held that material conveying “penal
philosophy” may not be considered, such that consideration of this brand of “official opposition” is clearly
improper. See King v New York State Div of Parole, 190 A.D 2d at 433 Yet even if it were appropriate for
consideration, if the “opposition” material is years old, it is “stale,” and it constitutes “irrationality bordering on
impropriety” to rely upon it as a basis for denying parole See Hopps v NY State Bd of Parole, No 2553 /2018
(Sup. Ct. Orange Cty Aug. 1, 2018) (“[ T ]he only evidence in the record or otherwise submitted to the Court that

. . .

.

.

.

.

.

-

31

.

.

.

.

. .

.

.

-

32

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

27
41 of 60

.

.

.

.

.

INDEX NO.

FILED: SULLIVAN COUNTY CLERK 01/15/2021 06:13 PM
NYSCEF DOC. NO. 106

RECEIVED NYSCEF: 01/15/2021
FUSL000094

Decision, the de novo Decision fails to abide by Section 259 -i.33

.

7

The de novo Decision contains two errors offact, both of which have
appeared in previous denials, and both of which demonstrate that the de
novo interview was a sham intended to create a mootness issue for
Petitioner .

In the de novo Decision, the Board made two factually incorrect assertions, either of which

alone would warrant reversal. First, the Board declared that Mr.

’s supposed lack of

emotion was “noted by [his] sentencing judge thirty years ago.” Dkt. No. 29 at 44. That is factually
incorrect. At Mr.

’s sentencing, it was the prosecutor who commented on Mr.

’s

alleged lack of emotion. See Dkt. No. 65 at 3 (wherein Mr. Healy, not the judge, alleges that Mr.

“has demonstrated no emotion.”) The judge made no such statement. See id.
Furthermore, Mr.
that Mr.

’s defense attorney took specific issue with the prosecutor ’s allegation
lacked emotion and stated, on the record, that everything Mr.

had and

had not said since his arrest was on the advice of counsel. Id. at 6. And the de novo Decision

contains a second factually incorrect statement that was relied upon as a basis for denying parole
release. In the de novo Decision, the Board wrote, “[r]ecords indicate you had made several calls in
an effort to find a female who would come meet you.” Dkt. No. 29 at 42. This statement is also

explicitly false. The only person Mr.

called on the day of the crime he committed was the

female victim.34

33

34

might be argued to constitute [official opposition] are statements made by the victim’s sister at the time of
sentencing (some 25 years ago), and documents generated around the same time[.] [ T ]he Court finds no even
relatively current information that would support a finding that there was ‘official opposition and significant and
persuasive community opposition on file’ . . . . [I]t is irrationality bordering on impropriety for the Board to deny
parole based on statements about the Petitioner’s suitability for release at or around the time of the underlying
offense, some 25 years ago.”). The letters from Healy are dated 1999 and 2008, making the most recent letter 12
years old. Mr, Healy is no longer even the District Attorney. Michael D. Calarco is the current District Attorney
|’s release. Thus, not only are the
of Wayne County, and his office has expressed no opposition to Mr.
letters “stale;” they were penned by a man who is no longer a state “official.”
This substantial and novel issue would have evaded judicial review had the Petition been dismissed as moot.
Concerning this exact factual error, which was discussed during oral argument before the Appellate Division,
Second Department in March 2019, the Justices accepted, on the record, Petitioner’s representation that there is
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The de novo panel’s specious findings, utterly belied by the record, are plainly erroneous and
warrant reversal. See Rivera v. Stanford, 172 A.D.3 d 872, 873-74 (2d Dep’t 2019) (Board’s finding

that release was not compatible with the welfare of society based upon prison disciplinary record was
without support in the record); Coleman v. New York State Dep ’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision 157
A.D.3 d 672, 673 (2d Dep’t 2018) (“Contrary to the Parole Board’s determination that the petitioner

‘distance[d] ’ himself lfom the crime, the record demonstrates that the petitioner took full
responsibility for his actions...”). Yet apart from that point, which is merely tangential to this

appeal, both of these errors are mere recitations from previous parole denial decisions. 35

Thus, Mr.

respectfully asserts that a pro-forma order for a new interview would

merely permit the Board to do what it has done over and over for the last twelve years: prejudge that

.

Mr.

should spend his life in prison regardless of his rehabilitation, hold a sham interview

cite to false information, proclaim illogical conclusions, bow to political pressure, and point to youth

.

as an aggravating, rather than a mitigating factor. There is no question that, in that case Petitioner

would once again be denied the constitutionally mandated meaningful opportunity for release to
which he is entitled. As such, a simple order that he should receive a new interview will not remedy

the ongoing violation of his rights.
B.

If the Court Does Not Order Release, It Should Order a de novo Hearing Before
Wherein the Board
Commissioners Who Have Never Interviewed Mr.
May Not Consider Non-Statutory Factors.

Petitioner respectfully asserts that he cannot and will not receive the relief to which he is
entitled if this Court merely orders a new interview before the Board, as evidenced by the description

.

above. Thus, should the Court decline to order release Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court

35

no factual basis in the record—including the trial record—that Mr.
ever called any person other than
the victim on the date of the crime. The allegation is entirely fabricated.
Had the Petition been dismissed as moot, this substantial and novel issue would have evaded judicial review.
See Marino, 13 A.D. at 455 (finding absence of mootness in light of “substantial issue” that had recurred through
parole interviews).
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order a new interview before Commissioners who have never interviewed him. Further, Petitioner
requests that the order explicitly state the following: First, that purported “community opposition”

and/or “official opposition,” may not be considered, as neither are permissible statutory factors under
New York law. Second, that the Board may not consider factual errors, like those relied upon in

previous parole decisions (including but not limited to the allegation that Mr.

called

multiple peers on the day of the underlying crime, or that he has shown a lack of remorse or

emotion). Third, to the extent the Board believes departure from Mr.

’s low-risk

.

COMPAS score is warranted, the rationale for that departure (a) must be explained in explicit detail

and (b) may not be based upon the seriousness of the underlying offense. Fourth, that the Board

.

may not rely on subjective impressions concerning Mr

’s rehabilitation and/or remorse as

grounds for denial, particularly to the extent those subjective impressions conflict with the
professional opinion of Dr. Cheryl Paradis in her forensic psychological evaluation of Mr.
Fifth, that Petitioner’s youth at the time of the underlying offense must be considered as a mitigating

factor that counsels in favor of release. Sixth, that the Board may not substitute its subjective

impression concerning Petitioner ’s remorsefulness, rehabilitation, insight, or presentation at the

interview as a replacement for the professional opinions of Dr. Cheryl Paradis in her Forensic
Psychological Report. See Dkt. No. 23. Petitioner further requests that this Court add any specific

instructions needed to ensure that the resulting decision is neither arbitrary nor capricious.
III.

THE PROCEDURAL OBJECTIONS RAISED BY RESPONDENT ARE MERITLESS,
AND HAVE ALREADY BEEN RULED ON BY THIS COURT.

As Respondent is well aware, this Court already ruled that the Petition is not moot. See

Exhibit l.36 Thus, Respondent’s attempt to “renew its prior argument for dismissal” in its Opposition

36

Insofar as the Opposition claims that the Court did not address the arguments underlying the motion to dismiss,
see Opp. at U 29, Respondent is mistaken. The Court denied Respondent’s motion in its entirety, and was under
no obligation to address each and every minutia of the argument that Respondent had advanced in support

thereof.
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to the Petition, see Opp. at K 3, is procedurally improper. If Respondent wanted to reargue the

motion to dismiss, it was obliged to make a motion requesting leave to reargue. See C.P.L.R. § 2221

.

(“A motion for leave to renew or to reargue a prior motion, for leave to appeal lfom, or to stay

vacate or modify, an order shall be made, on notice, to the judge who signed the order[.]”); Siegel,

N.Y. Prac. § 254 (6th ed.) (“A motion to reargue is based on no new proof; it seeks to convince the
court that it overlooked or misapprehended something on the first go around and ought to change its

mind. The motion to renew (or rehear) is based on new or additional proof not used the first time
around or a change in the law.”). Respondent has also failed to abide by the C.P.L.R. insofar as it
has not pointed to the things in the original motion that the Court “overlooked or misapprehended.”
C.P.L.R. § 2221(d)(2). And new information that Respondent may want this Court to consider—for

instance, the discussion in Paragraph 16 of Respondent’s Opposition—is not properly included in a
motion to reargue. See Siegel,N.Y. Prac. § 254 (6th ed.). Thus, the Court need not revisit the issues
upon which it has already ruled because it never granted Respondent leave to reargue, and the Court

should not consider any arguments advanced in the Opposition that were not raised in the original
motion to dismiss. Nonetheless, Petitioner herein articulates why the Court’s ruling was correct.37

.

A

.

This Case is Not Moot

Contrary to Respondent’s arguments, the Court correctly decided that the Petition is not
moot.

“The threshold determination of whether [a] proceeding is subject to dismissal as moot, which

involves an analysis of whether this matter presents substantial issues that are likely to recur, is
intertwined with that of whether the Board’s determination should be annulled as arbitrary and
capricious.” Hill, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 9462, at *15 (citing Lovell 40 A.D.3 d at 1167 (holding

that although petitioner's reappearance before the parole board during the pendency of the appeal

37

Petitioner respectfully states that these arguments are presented for the Court’s convenience, and Petitioner is not
waiving any arguments, rights, or positions on these issues should Respondent appeal the decision denying the
motion to dismiss.
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“would normally have necessitated dismissal of the current appeal as moot, an exception to the
mootness doctrine is presented herein inasmuch as a substantial issue is involved,i.e., the failure to

comply with the provisions of Executive Law § 259 -i, which continues to evade review”); McLaurin,

27 A.D.3 d at 566 (finding mootness doctrine did not apply where petitioner had another parole
hearing as the record shows that the parole board still did not have or consider resentencing

minutes)).

.

1

.

The Vacatur Decision did not render the Petition moot

In the decision granting the de novo interview, the Appeals Unit conceded that Petitioner had

raised at least fourteen distinct grounds upon which the Decision must be vacated.38 It nonetheless
granted a de novo interview based on only one of the articulated grounds, and did not address

.

Petitioner ’s remaining arguments. See Dkt. No. 45 (the “Vacatur Decision”). Even assuming

arguendo, that the Petition did not fit squarely within the mootness exception, the Petition is not in
fact moot. Respondent argues that the Vacatur Decision renders the matter moot. See Resp. Aff. at H
14 (“The Appeals Unit decision vacating the 2019 decision and the inmate’s subsequent de novo

interview and decision - which supersedes the 2019 decision and is now the basis for the hold render a challenge to the 2019 decision moot.”); Opp. at If 18. But the Vacatur Decision did not grant
Mr.

the relief he sought. As the Appeals Unit itself acknowledged, Mr.

’s

administrative appeal from the Original Decision raised fourteen distinct and independent grounds
upon which the Original Decision must be vacated. See Dkt. No. 45 at 2. The Appeals Unit then

concluded: “Regarding issues raised arising out appellant's minor offender status, there were
questions from the Board concerning appellant’s youth and subsequent development. However, there
are valid concerns raised that the questioning in this interview didn't go deep enough into detail and
was too limited. As such, a de novo interview is required.” Id. On its face, the Vacatur Decision

38

Petitioner does not concede that the fourteen grounds listed by the Appeals Unit in the Vacatur Decision
encompass the full scope of Petitioner’s arguments.
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does not address any of the thirteen other grounds for reversal raised by Mr.

|, nor does it

order the Board to address any of those grounds in the de novo hearing. As such, even assuming,
arguendo, that one single issue was mooted (it was not), at least thirteen appellate issues remain ripe

for review by this Court.

.

2

This appeal fits squarely within a recognized exception to the mootness
doctrine

.

Respondent invokes the general rule that grant of a new parole interview can moot a
challenge to a prior parole denial. See Resp. Aff. at Dt 14, 15; Opp. at 1)1(18 - 19. Respondent further
asserts that the recognized exception that applies when an appeal challenges not merely the Board’s

weighing of relevant factors, but its complete and continuing failure to comply with substantial,
mandatory legal requirements concerning the parole determination does not apply here. See Opp. at

K 22. Respondent is mistaken.39

See McLaurin, 27 A.D.3 d 565; Lovell, 40 A.D.3 d 1166; Standley ,

34 A.D.3 d 1169; see also Marino, 13 A.D. at 455 (finding absence of mootness in fight of

“substantial issue” that had recurred through parole interviews); In re Melinda D., 31 A.D.3 d at 29
(finding absence of mootness where appeal challenged “noncompliance with the requirements of

Social Services Law § 374-a”); Hill v. New York State Bd. of Parole, No. 100121/20, 2020 N.Y.

Misc. LEXIS 9462, * 15 - 16 (N.Y. Sup. Oct. 23, 2020) (finding that subsequent parole interviews did
not moot appeal); see also Gonzalez v. Annucci , 32 N.Y.3 d 461, 470 (2018) (reasserting that

“substantial and novel issues that are likely to be repeated and will typically evade review” are
excepted from mootness challenges).
Hill is particularly instructive. 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 9462. In Hill —as here—Respondent

39

Respondent is also incorrect to assert that the Court of Appeals “implicitly agreed” that “[c ]hallenges to parole
|’s appeal from his fifth parole
denials do not typically evade review” when it declined to hear Mr.
denial. Opp. at " If 22-23. The Court of Appeals’ decision not to hear the previous appeal obviously has no
bearing on a new Article 78 special proceeding arising from a new parole denial, and as the body of caselaw
cited throughout this Section demonstrates, New York courts routinely apply the mootness exception in the
context of parole.
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argued that “[petitioner’s] reappearance before the Board rendered] the prior parole decision moot as
once a new final decision of parole is issued, a parole applicant cannot be granted relief based on a

prior allegedly improper parole denial.” Id. at * 10. Like Mr.

institutional record while incarcerated, and like Mr.

, Hill had an exceptional
, the Board denied Hill release because

the panel deemed that his “release would be incompatible with the welfare of society,” in spite of all
evidence to the contrary. Id. at * 16-* 17. The court concluded that the matter was not moot because
the original and later decisions were arbitrary and capricious. It held:
Here, the court finds that the Board’s January 2019 and April 2020
decisions denying petitioner parole release support a finding that
substantial issues exist that will continue to evadereview as theBoard’s
decisions denying parole present issues as to whether the Board’s
denials were based on the nature and seriousness of the underlying
crime committed by Mr. Hill when he was 19 years old, without
considering other factors under Executive Law § 2 5 9 -i . . . .

The seriousness of Mr. Hill’s crime and the permanent and tragic
effects it had on the officer’s life are clear, and the decision reflects the
Board’s careful consideration of these factors. The Board’s decision,
however, does not reflect the basis of its finding that Mr. Hill poses a
danger to society. The Board failed to articulate the reasons for this
determination with respect to Mr. Hill’s low COMPAS Risks and
Needs Assessment scores or to “provide an individualized reason for
Accordingly,
this departure,” in accordance with 9 NYCRR 8002.2
the court concludes that the Board’s determination was arbitrary and
capricious and irrational bordering on impropriety . . . .
The court’s conclusion is supported by the submissions before the
Board and its decision which lacks a foundation for its determination
that Mr. Hill, at present, poses a danger to society, and demonstrates
that theBoard, while referring to the statutory factors, did not consider
all statutory factors, but focused solely on the underlying crime.
Id. at * 15 -* 18. (citing Rivera, 172 A.D.3 d 872; Marino, 13 A.D. 453 (finding that the Parole Board’s

determination was “irrational bordering on impropriety” where petitioner appeared several times
before the Board and his release was denied for the same reasons, without new or additional relevant
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evidence or any other submission in support of its determination)). The parallels between Hill and

.

this case are uncanny. Like Mr. Hill, Mr.

committed a serious crime, but in the time since

he has been an exemplary inmate, as demonstrated by his impressive disciplinary and educational
record. Like Mr. Hill, Mr.

has across-the-board low-risk COMPAS scores, and a strong

re-entry plan. Nonetheless, the Board has offered no explanation whatsoever—in either the original

Decision or in the de novo Decision— for why it departed from his COMPAS score.
Similarly, in McLaurin, the petitioner challenged the Board’s failure to consider resentencing

minutes, which he correctly argued constituted a “sentencing recommendation” that the Board was
required to consider under Executive Law § 259-i. 27 A.D.3 d at 566. “After the appeal was
perfected and before oral argument,” the petitioner attended another parole hearing. Id. The Court

acknowledged that “[o]rdinarily this would have rendered the appeal academic.” Id. But it declined
to dismiss the appeal as moot because, in the more recent parole hearing, “the Board still [did] not

have the resentencing minutes and has not considered them.” Id. For that reason, “[t]he matter
presented] an exception to the mootness doctrine because the substantial issue presented is likely to
recur.” Id.

The decisions in Lovell and Standley are squarely in accord. Lovell, 40 A.D.3 d at 1167
(“Although such a reappearance would normally have necessitated dismissal of the current appeal as
moot, an exception to the mootness doctrine is presented herein inasmuch as a substantial issue is

involved,i.e., the failure to comply with the provisions of Executive Law § 259-i, which continues to
evade review.”); Standley , 34 A.D.3 d at 1170 (noting that when petitioner reappeared during the
pendency of the appeal, “the Board again failed to consider [required] factors,” so that “although

petitioner ’s reappearance would normally render th[e] appeal moot, an exception to the mootness

doctrine is presented inasmuch as a substantial issue is involved which continues to evade review.”).
Indeed, in Lovell, the Board even promised to consider the very materials that were the subject of the
appeal in an upcoming parole interview, but the court still found that the mootness exception applied.
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Lovell, 40 A.D.3 d at 1170. E.g „ Marino, 13 A.D.3 d 453; Lebron v. Alexander , 68 A.D.3 d 1476,
1477 (3 d Dep’t 2009); cf. People ex rel. Donohoe v. Montanye, 35 N.Y.2d 221, 224-25 (1974) (same

in habeas corpus context). Such an appeal presents a “substantial issue” that is “likely to recur,”
McLaurin, 27 A.D.3 d at 566, but that will “evade review” if the appeal is dismissed, Standley , 34
A.D.3 d at 1170; accord Lovell, 40 A.D.3 d 1166; Marino, 13 A.D.3 d at 455; Lebron, 68 A.D.3 d at

1477; Donohoe, 35 N.Y.2d at 224-25.

Notably, Respondent has made minimal effort to distinguish the cases cited above from the
facts of this case. Moreover, Respondent misapprehends Petitioner ’s arguments concerning what

“substantial and novel” issues would evade review if mootness applied. Respondent writes, “[n]or
does Petitioner ’s apparent challenge raise any substantial or novel issue that would warrant
disregarding the mootness of his claims. Similar arguments—that the Board failed to consider his
youth and failed to properly weigh the statutory factors—are regularly raised by inmates and
consistently resolved by the courts.” Opp. at 122. The failure to consider Mr.

’s youth is

just one of a multitude errors the Board of Parole has made (and repeated) in the course of denying
Mr.

parole. See supra Section II (detailing the errors that are present in both the Original

Decision and in the de novo Decision). Presumably, Respondent has failed to address the other
errors because there is no good faith argument to be made that those errors are outside the mootness

exception.
In reality, this case falls within the established exception applied in the above cases. Mr.

has argued that the Decision must be vacated for numerous reasons, including, inter alia: it
is conclusory and evades intelligent review; it draws illogical conclusions contradicted by the facts; it
relies solely on the seriousness of the offense as grounds for denial; it is inconsistent with New York

caselaw; it discounts and misapplies factors that weigh in favor of release; it incorrectly weighs the
factors the Board purportedly considered; it does not actually account for all factors; it fails to

consider Petitioner ’s youth at the time of the offense in violation of the Eighth Amendment; to the
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extent youth was considered, it was in the wrong inquiry, in violation of the Eighth Amendment; to

the extent youth was considered, youth was weighed as a factor against release, in violation of the
Eighth Amendment; it relies on facts not found by a jury, in violation of the Sixth Amendment; it

increases Mr.

’s mandatory minimum sentence, in violation of the Sixth Amendment; and it

increases Mr.

’s mandatory maximum sentence, in violation of the Sixth Amendment. See

Dkt. No. 17. As noted above, all of these errors were repeated in the de novo interview. Mr.
has thus asserted a plethora of “substantial and novel issues” that already have and will
continue to be repeated. Gonzalez, 32 N.Y.3 d at 470. If the Petition had been dismissed on
mootness grounds, those issues would evade judicial review.

3.

.

The de novo Decision repeated the same errors as the Original Decision

When considering a mootness challenge to an Article 78 petition arising lfom parole denial,
the court may consider the outcome of the subsequent hearing that allegedly rendered the petition

..

moot. See, e.g Hill, 2020 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 9462, at * 15. Given that “[t]he threshold

determination of whether this proceeding is subject to dismissal as moot . . . is intertwined with that
of whether the Board’s determination should be annulled as arbitrary and capricious[,]” that

consideration must necessarily evaluate the new determination. See id. In light of the fact that
Respondent—not Petitioner—has placed the de novo Decision at issue by raising mootness, Mr.
asserts that the de novo Decision has repeated the very errors that rendered the Original

Decision subject to dismissal. See supra at Section II. These repeated errors demonstrate
unequivocally that, had the Petition been dismissed as moot, substantial and novel issues would

evade judicial review.
B.

This Court Has Broad Authority to Cure Alleged Procedural Defects in an
Article 78 Special Proceeding.

As Respondent knows, this Court already ruled on its attempts to win dismissal of the
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.

Petition on procedural grounds. See Exhibit 1 at 10-11.40 Yet even if that were not so Respondent’s
arguments on these supposed procedural infirmities are meritless. The Court’s denial of

Respondent’s motion to dismiss the Petition on these grounds was appropriate, and there are no
grounds for revisiting or disturbing the Court’s holdings.

.

1

.

Petitioner filed a timely petition

Petitioner commenced this action on July 24, 2020. As of that date, neither Petitioner nor
counsel had been notified of any decision from the Appeals Unit of the Board of Parole. As
Respondent concedes, see Opp. at If 11, Petitioner perfected his administrative appeal from the

decision underlying this case on March 10, 2020. Thus, the four -month period within which the
Appeals Unit had to decide the administrative appeal before Petitioner was entitled to bring this
special proceeding expired on July 10, 2020. Respondent suggests that mere coincidence—and not

intent to moot this appeal—underlies the date on the Appeals Unit decision. Id. Petitioner
respectfully disagrees, and asserts that this deus ex machina is altogether too convenient not to be
suspect. But regardless of the motives of the Appeals Unit in issuing a decision fourteen days after

their time to weigh in had expired (and, purportedly, on the exact same date that Petition filed this
proceeding, and also without giving timely notice of the same to counsel), the fact remains. The

Petition was timely.

.

2

The matter before this Court was still pending when Petitioner sought to re
serve, such that the request for extension to serve was appropriate

.

¬

Petitioner sought an extension of time to serve Respondent on December 9, 2020, just one
day after it learned of Respondent’s objections to service, while the matter was still pending. See

40

This Court already held: “[ T ]he documents submitted are so absolutely clear in that they’re seeking to overturn
the decision of the New York State Board of Parole denying parole to the petitioner, that to decide otherwise
would be a process of super technical procedure overruling common sense and logic and straightforwardness and
absolutely clear pleadings as to what is being sought and the fact that the counsel for petitioner is verifying what
they’re seeking and the in-depth affidavits and memorandums of law spelling out exactly what this case is all
about are so overwhelmingly clear and straightforward, thatIam not going to grant the application by the
respondent to dismiss it on those super technical grounds.”
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Dkt. Nos. 37-58. The extension request was timely and the Court had jurisdiction and authority to
grant the request. See, e.g., U.S. Bank Nat. Ass ’n v. Saintus , 153 A.D.3 d 1380, 1382 (2d Dep’t 2017)

(“Contrary to [defendant’s] contention, the court did not lack jurisdiction to entertain this branch of

the plaintiffs motion. Inasmuch as no judgment was entered dismissing the action, the action was
pending when the plaintiff moved to extend the time to serve [defendant] with process.”).

.

3

Respondent ’s allegation that the request for more time to serve “contain[ed]
materials not used to commence the action ” is demonstrably false

.

As counsel made clear in its request to re-serve, no new documents were included with the
request. See Dkt. No. 56 at n.1 (“For ease of access, these documents have been combined into a

single PDF with a title page identifying the document. The title page of the Memorandum of Law has

also been updated.”). Thus, Respondent’s contention that “docket numbers 55 -58 ... contain
materials not utilized to commence the action” is patently incorrect. See Dkt. No. 60 at 2.

.

4

This Court is empowered to invoke C.P.L.R. 306-b to cure alleged service
defects and extension was warranted here

.

Extensions of time to serve under C.P.L.R. Section 306-b are permitted in the context of
Article 78 proceedings. See Brooklyn Housing and Family Services v. Lynch, 191 Misc.2d 341, 351
(Sup. Ct. Jan. 24, 2002) (granting extension to petitioners, and noting that “[i]n affirming the Leader ,

Scarabaggio, and Hafkin cases, the New York Court of Appeals confirmed that [Section] 306-b
empowers a court faced with the dismissal of a viable claim to consider any factor relevant to the

exercise of its discretion under the interest of justice standard. No one factor is determinative—the
calculus of the court’s decision is dependent on the competing interests of the litigants and a clearly
expressed desire by the Legislature that the interests of justice be served.”) (internal quotation marks

and citations omitted). Petitioner followed the appropriate procedural steps to be entitled to the relief
sought by filing a new order to show cause on December 9, 2020. See generally Matter of Frederick
v. Goord, 20 A.D.3 d 652, 653 (3 d Dep’t 2005) (holding that when an Article 78 proceeding is

initiated by order to show cause and petitioner seeks leave to re-serve under Section 306-b, the
39
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appropriate method is via a new order to show cause).

.

a

.

The periodfor service could be extendedfor good cause

“To establish good cause, a plaintiff must demonstrate reasonable diligence in attempting
service. Good cause will not exist where a plaintiff fails to make any effort at service or fails to
make at least a reasonably diligent effort at service. By contrast, good cause may be found to exist
where the plaintiff’s failure to timely serve process is a result of circumstances beyond the plaintiff’s
control.” State of New York Mortgage Agency v. Braun, 182 A.D.3 d 63, 66 (2d Dep’t 2020); see also
Harris Bay Yacht Club v. Town of Queensbury , 46 A.D.3 d 1304, 1306 (3 d Dep’t. 2007) (finding

good cause where petitioner attempted to make timely service, but papers were mailed to the wrong

address). Here, good cause exists. Not only did Petitioner make a good faith effort to serve
Respondent, see, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 34-36 (demonstrating that Petitioner attempted to serve Respondent
the day after the Court signed the order to show cause), but moreover, the service issues to which

Respondent objects were a direct consequence of the interruption to normal law practice caused by

the COVID- 19 pandemic. Counsel for Petitioner—like counsel for Respondent—is practicing law
remotely, which presents a multitude of new challenges and obstacles that are outside the parties

control.41 Thus, there was good cause under Section 306-b to grant an extension.

.

b

.

The periodfor service could be extended in the interest ofjustice

Yet even if the extension were not warranted based on good cause, granting the extension
was in the interest of justice. According to the Court of Appeals:

The interest of justice standard requires a careful judicial analysis of
the factual setting of the case and a balancing of the competing interests
presented by the parties. Unlike an extension request premised on good
cause, a plaintiff need not establish reasonably diligent efforts at
service as a threshold matter. However, the court may consider
41

Petitioner notes that counsel for Respondent has likewise been impacted by the challenges posed by remote legal
practice, as evidenced by counsel’s inability to file all exhibits to the Opposition before the January 11, 2020
deadline, to whichPetitioner did not object. See Dkt. Nos. 73 -101 (all dated January 12, 2020, not January 11,
2020).
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diligence, or lack thereof, along with any other relevant factor in
making its determination, including expiration of the Statute of
Limitations, the meritorious nature of the cause of action, the length of
delay in service, the promptness of a plaintiff’s request for the
extension of time, and prejudice to defendant.
Leader v. Maroney , Ponzini & Spencer , 97 N.Y.2d 95, 105 -06 (2001). See also Mighty v.
Deshommes, 115 178 A.D.3 d 912, 914 (2d Dep’t 2019) (collecting cases) (“In determining whether
to grant an extension of time to serve ... in the interest of justice the court may consider diligence, or

lack thereof, along with any other relevant factor in making its determination, including expiration of
the Statute of Limitations, the [potentially] meritorious nature of the cause of action, the length of
delay in service, the promptness of a plaintiff’s request for the extension of time, and prejudice to

defendant.”); Vanyo v. Buffalo Police Benevolent Association, 159 A.D.3 d 1448, 1449 (4th Dep’t
2018) (“[T]he interest of justice standard of the statute is a separate, broader and more flexible

provision [than good cause] that may encompass a mistake or oversight as long as there was no
prejudice to the defendant”); Pennington v. Da Nico Restaurant, 123 A.D.3 d 627, 627-28 (1st Dep’t
2014) (“Plaintiff’s cross motion for an extension of time to serve ... pursuant to C.P.L.R. § 306-b,

should be granted in the interest of justice. The absence of due diligence on plaintiff’s part is

.

mitigated by the facts that [defendant] had timely notice of the claim; [defendant] had been timely

albeit defectively, served; plaintiff had communicated with [defendant’s] insurer and provided the

insurer with copies of relevant medical records; there was no prejudice to [defendant]; and the statute
of limitations had expired since the commencement of the action.”).

As the Court indicated at oral argument on December 15, 2020, the Petition is meritorious

and raises issues of significant legal import. In addition, though Respondent asserts that service was

.

defective, the vast majority of the docket was served on Respondent on December 1 in hard copy

and the remainder of the materials were accessible via the e-filed docket. See, e.g., Dkt. Nos. 37-54.

..

Thus, Respondent had actual notice of the action on that date. See, e.g Leader , 97 N.Y.2d at 107
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(“Defendant failed to show any prejudice, particularly in light of some evidence in the record that it

had actual notice of the action.”). Moreover, the Court’s order concerning service imposes no
prejudice whatsoever on Respondent. See id:, Brooklyn Housing and Family Services v. Lynch, 191

Misc.2d 341, 349 (Sup. Ct. 2002) (quoting Busier v. Corbett , 259 A.D.2d 13 (4th Dep’t 1999))
(holding that “‘prejudice’ for C.P.L.R. [§] 306-b purposes requires a showing that the extension

would impair ‘defendant’s ability to defend on the merits, rather than merely cause the loss of such a
procedural or technical advantage.’”). And though Petitioner does not concede as much, had the

Petition been dismissed and Petitioner refiled a new action, certainly Respondent would argue that
the statute of limitations had run and precluded the action. In light of these facts—along with the
Petitioner ’s diligence not just in attempting service, but also in seeking leave to re-serve—it was in

the interest of justice to permit re-service.

.

5

This Court is empowered to invoke CP.L.R. 2004 to cure alleged service

defects.

Even if 306-b could not cure the alleged service defect, an extension would be appropriate

.

under C.P.L.R. § 2004. Section 2004 provides: “the court may extend the time fixed by any statute

rule or order for doing any act, upon such terms as may be just and upon good cause shown, whether

the application for extension is made before or after the expiration of the time fixed.” C.P.L.R. §
2004. Article 78 judges have authority to invoke Section 2004 to permit service-related extensions.

See, e.g., Mullings v. Lee, 178 A.D.3 d 1217, 1218 (3 d Dep’t 2019); Matter ofMeighan v. Ponte, 144
A.D.3 d 917, 918 (2d Dep’t 2016). Clearly, the Court was empowered to grant the requested relief

under Section 2004. See, e.g., Geffen Motors Inc. v. Chrysler Corp ., 54 Misc.2d 403 (Sup. Ct. July
31, 1967) (analyzing the factors that warrant extension to serve under Section 2004, including lack of

willfulness in failure to complete service and plaintiffs prompt request to re-serve).

.

6

The Article 78 court has extensive authority to correct alleged procedural
defects in form of filing.

Respondent asserts that “[t]his special proceeding was not properly commenced pursuant to
42
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C.P.L.R. § 7804 and is therefore subject to dismissal. A verified petition is required to commence an

Article 78 proceeding.” Opp. at If 28. Respondent continues, “Respondent is precluded from
submitting an Answer/Retum as there is no Petition for which [sic ] they could respond.” Id. at If 29.
Once again, Respondent’s desperate efforts to sidestep the merits are fruitless, and without basis in

the law.42 It is beyond question that this Court has authority to correct alleged procedural errors that
cause no prejudice to Respondent. See, e.g., C.P.L.R. § 2001 (“At any stage of an action, including

the filing of a summons with notice, summons and complaint or petition to commence an action, the
court may permit a mistake, omission, defect or irregularity ... to be corrected, upon such terms as

may be just, or, if a substantial right of a party is not prejudiced, the mistake, omission, defect or

irregularity shall be disregarded[.]”); Creole Enterprises, Inc. v. Giuliani , 167 Misc. 2d 810 (Sup. Ct.
1995), order aff’d, 236 A.D.2d 272 (1st Dep’t 1997) (finding that, though no formal petition had

been filed, the “technical defect [was] not fatal” to the Article 78 proceeding because “respondents
received adequate notice of the issues involved and suffered no prejudice” based on the materials that
were filed, such that the court was empowered to exercise “its discretion and [deem] the proceeding

properly commenced”); 24 Carmody-Wait 2d § 145:371 (citing C.P.L.R. 103(c)) (“[A] civil judicial
proceeding will not be dismissed solely because it is not brought in the proper form, but the court

will make whatever order is required for its proper prosecution.”); 24 Carmody-Wait 2d § 145:183
(citing Bango v. Gouverneur Volunteer Rescue Squad , 101 A.D.3 d 1556 (3 d Dep’t 2012))

(discussing the Supreme Court’s authority to treat a complaint against a “quasi-government body” as
an Article 78 petition); 3A Carmody-Wait 2d § 23:13 (citing Vincent v. Seaman, 142 Misc.2d 196

(Cty. Ct. 1989); Jakobleffv . Jakobleff, 119 Misc.2d 931 (Sup. Ct. 1983), rev 'd on other grounds, 108

A.D.2d 725 (2d Dep’t 1985); Rock Wool Insulation Co. v. Puma, 46 Misc. 2d 199 (N.Y. City Ct.

42

Respondent has cited only C.P.L.R, § 7804 in support of its proposition that the procedural errors it alleges
occurred are fatal to the Petition, and has completely disregarded the large body of statutory and case law that
stands for the opposite proposition.
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1965), rev ’d on other grounds, 48 Misc.2d 193 (App. Term 1965); Washington Life Ins. Co. v. Scott,
119 A.D. 847 (1st Dep’t 1907)) (“It is the policy of the courts to be liberal and not unduly harsh and

punitive in their treatment of parties and attorneys who have made mistakes and to look with

tolerance upon errors and defects in pleading and practice where those errors and defects may be
corrected without affecting the substantial rights of the litigants. Thus, the court ’s discretion to
correct or disregard a mistake, omission, defect, or irregularity should be exercised lfeely and

liberally whenever it is in the furtherance of justice to do so.”). Indeed, it is a bedrock foundation of
New York law that “great power is conferred upon the court to amend a pleading . . . . [because] the
purpose of a trial is to do justice, and not to prevent it by invoking technical rules of pleading or

practice. The power, therefore, which the court has to permit an amendment to a pleading ought to

be freely exercised.” Washington Life Ins. Co ., 119 A.D. at 847.
Respondent has (rightfully) not even attempted to argue that the alleged error in form caused
Respondent any prejudice whatsoever. And despite efforts at oral argument to suggest that
Respondent did not know what relief Petitioner seeks, see, e.g.,Exhibit 1 at 8 (“There’s nothing for

the respondents to respond to if a petition doesn’t exist. We have to deny. We have to DKI.”); 27
(“Which docket number would you like us to respond to, [Y]our Honor?”), the Opposition

demonstrates that Respondent is well aware of the relief being sought. Thus, the Court correctly
denied Respondent’s motion to dismiss the Petition on “super technical grounds,” id. at 10, because

the Court concluded that “the documents submitted by petitioner, on behalf of the petitioner, are so
absolutely clear as to what the petitioner seeks” andbecause not even Respondent has suggested that

it is prejudiced by the alleged procedural error.43 There is no reason the Court should revisit or

43

To preserve the issue, Petitioner further asserts that he would be greatly prejudiced by dismissal on these
grounds, as upon refiling Respondent would undoubtedly argue that the statute of limitations barred a new
petition. Although Petitioner contends that Respondent would be incorrect on that point, he would certainly face
risk of dismissal on those grounds.

.
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disturb that holding.
IV.

THE BOARD’S DECISION WAS UNREASONABLE. ILLOGICAL. ARBITRARY.
AND CAPRICIOUS.

The sum total of Respondent’s arguments in opposition to the merits of the Petition is that the
Board acted reasonably. Petitioner will not rehash the arguments already outlined in previous
briefing. Suffice to say; “It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say

what the law is.” Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176-77 (1803). The Decision can only be
described as arbitrary, capricious, irrational, and improper, and this Court has the power to deem it
such.
CONCLUSION

For all of these reasons, the requested relief should be granted.
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